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Abstract When proof assistants and theorem provers implement the metatheory of
logical systems, they must deal with a range of syntactic expressions (e.g., types, for-
mulas, and proofs) that involve variable bindings. Since most mature proof assistants
do not have built-in methods to treat bindings, they have been extended with various
packages and libraries that allow them to encode such syntax using, for example, de
Bruijn numerals. We put forward the argument that bindings are such an intimate
aspect of the structure of expressions that they should be accounted for directly in the
underlying programming language support for proof assistants and not via packages
and libraries. We present an approach to designing programming languages and proof
assistants that directly supports bindings in syntax. The roots of this approach can be
found in the mobility of binders between term-level bindings, formula-level bindings
(quantifiers), and proof-level bindings (eigenvariables). In particular, the combination
of Church’s approach to terms and formulas (found in his Simple Theory of Types)
and Gentzen’s approach to proofs (found in his sequent calculus) yields a framework
for the interaction of bindings with a full range of logical connectives and quantifiers.
We will also illustrate how that framework provides a direct and semantically clean
treatment of computation and reasoning with syntax containing bindings. Some imple-
mented systems, which support this intimate and built-in treatment of bindings, will
be briefly described.
Keywords mechanized metatheory, λ-tree syntax, mobility of binders
1 Metatheory and its mechanization
Theorem proving—in both its interactive and automatic forms—has been applied in
a wide range of domains. A frequent use of theorem provers is to formally establish
correctness properties for specific programs: e.g., prove that a given program always
terminates and correctly sorts a list or prove that a given loop satisfies a given invariant.
A more niche domain to which theorem proving is applied is that of the metatheory
of programming languages. In this domain, one takes a formal definition of a particular
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programming language’s static semantics (e.g., typing), dynamic semantics (e.g., eval-
uation), and translation semantics (e.g., compilation) and establishes properties about
all programs in that programming language. Typical examples of metatheorems are
the following.
1. If evaluation attributes values U and V to program M , then U and V are equal
(see, for example, [110, Theorem 2.4]). Thus, evaluation is a partial function.
2. If M is attributed the value V and it has the type A, then V has type A also. Thus,
types are preserved when evaluating an expression (see, for example, [163]).
3. Applicative bisimulation for the programming language is a congruence (see, for
example, [2,73]. Thus, equational-style rewriting can be used to reason about ap-
plicative bisimulation.
A theorem prover that is used for proving such metatheorems must deal with struc-
tures that are linguistic in nature: that is, metatheorems often need to quantify over
programs, program phrases, types, values, terms, and formulas. A particularly chal-
lenging aspect of linguistic expressions, one which separates them from other inductive
data structures (such as lists and binary trees), is their incorporation of bindings.
In fact, a number of research teams have used proof assistants to formally prove
significant properties of entire programming languages. Such properties include type
preservation, determinancy of evaluation, and the correctness of an OS microkernel
and of various compilers: see, for example, [79,82,84,113].
The authors of the POPLmark challenge [12] had pointed out that proving metathe-
orems about programming languages is often a difficult task given the proof assistants
available at that time (in 2005). In particular, their experiments with formulating the
metatheory of programming languages within various proof assistants led them to urge
the developers of proof assistants to improve their systems.
Our conclusion from these experiments is that the relevant technology has de-
veloped almost to the point where it can be widely used by language researchers.
We seek to push it over the threshold, making the use of proof tools common
practice in programming language research—mechanized metatheory for the
masses. [12]
These authors also acknowledge that poor support for binders in syntax was one prob-
lem that held back proof assistants from achieving even more widespread use by pro-
gramming language researchers and practitioners.
In the decade following the POPLmark challenge, a number of approaches to rep-
resenting syntax containing bindings have been proposed, analyzed, and applied to
metatheory issues. These approaches go by names such as locally nameless [26], nom-
inal reasoning [10,133,136,164], and parametric higher-order abstract syntax [29]. In
the end, nothing canonical seems to have arisen: see [11,135] for detailed compar-
isons between different representational approaches. On the other hand, most of these
approaches have been used to take existing mature proof assistants, such as Coq or
Isabelle, and extend them with new packages, new techniques, new features, and/or
new front-ends.
The incremental extension of mature proof assistants is only one way to address
this issue. In this paper, we highlight another approach to mechanized metatheory and
we use the following analogy to set the stage for that approach.
Early implementations of operating systems and distributed systems forced pro-
grammers to deal with concurrency, a feature not directly supported in early pro-
gramming languages. Various treatments of concurrency and distributed computing
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were addressed by adding to mature programming languages thread packages, remote
procedure calls, and/or tuple spaces. Such additions made important contributions to
what computer systems could do in concurrent settings. Nonetheless, early pioneers
such as Dijkstra, Hoare, Milner, and Petri considered new ways to express and under-
stand concurrency via formalisms such as CCS, CSP, Petri Nets, π-calculus, etc. These
pioneers left the world of known and mature programming languages in an attempt to
find natural and direct treatments of concurrent behavior. While the resulting process
calculi did not provide a single, canonical approach to concurrency, their development
and study have led to significant insight into the nature of computation and interaction.
In a similar spirit, we will examine here an approach to metatheory that is not
based on extending mature theorem proving platforms. Instead, we look for means to
compute and reason with bindings within syntax that arise directly from logic and proof
theory, two topics that have a long tradition of allowing abstractions into the details
of syntactic representations. There has been a number of technical papers and a few
implementations that provide such an alternative approach to mechanized metatheory.
The goal of this paper is not technical: instead, it is intended to provide an overview
of this alternative approach.
2 Dropping mathematics as an intermediate
Before directly addressing some of the computational principles behind bindings in
syntax, it seems prudent to describe and challenge the conventional design of a wide
range of proof assistants.
Almost all ambitious theorem provers in use today follow the following two-step
approach to reasoning about computation [96].
Step 1: Implement mathematics. This step is achieved by picking a general, well un-
derstood formal system. Common choices are first-order logic, set theory [118],
higher-order logic [31,64], or some foundation for constructive mathematics, such
as Martin-Löf type theory [34,35,86].
Step 2: Reduce reasoning about computation to mathematics. Computational systems
can be encoded via a model-theoretic semantics (such as denotational semantics)
or as an inductive definition over a proof system encoding, say, an operational
semantics.
Placing (formalized) mathematics in the middle of this approach to reasoning about
computational systems is problematic since traditional mathematical approaches as-
sume extensional equality for sets and functions while computational settings may need
to distinguish such objects based on intensional properties. The notion of algorithm
is an example of this kind of distinction: there are many algorithms that can compute
the same function (say, the function that sorts lists of integers). In a purely exten-
sional treatment, functions are represented directly and descriptions of algorithms are
secondary. If an intensional default can be managed instead, then function values are
secondary (usually captured via the specification of evaluators or interpreters).
For an explicit example, consider whether or not the formula ∀w. λx.x 6= λx.w is
a theorem (assume that x and w are variables of some primitive type i). In a setting
where λ-abstractions denote functions (which is the usual extensional treatment), this
formula is equivalent to ∀w.¬∀x.x = w. As stated, we have not been provided enough
information to answer this question: in particular, this formula is true if and only if the
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domain type i is not a singleton. If, however, we are in a setting where λ-abstractions
denote syntactic expressions, then it is sensible for this formula to be provable since
no (capture-avoiding) substitution of an expression of type i for the w in λx.w can
yield λx.x. Taking this latter step means, of course, separating λ-abstraction from the
mathematical notion of function.
A key methodological element of this paper is that we shall drop mathematics
as an intermediate and attempt to find a direct and intimate connection between
computation, reasoning, and logic.
Church’s Simple Theory of Types [31] is one of the most significant and early steps
taken in the design of a rich and expressive logic. In that paper, Church showed how
it was possible to turn the tables on the usual presentation of terms and formulas in
quantificational logic. Most presentations of quantification logic defined terms first and
then formulas were defined to incorporate such terms (within atomic formulas). Church,
however, defined the general notion of simply typed λ-term and defined formulas as a
subset of such λ-terms, namely, those of type o. The resulting formal system provided
an elegant way to reduce all formula-level bindings (e.g., the universal and existential
quantifiers) to the λ-binder. His approach also immediately captured the binders used
in the definite description operators and Hilbert’s ε-operator. Church’s presentation of
formulas and terms are used in many active computational logic systems such as the
HOL provers [66], Isabelle [119], and λProlog [99].
Actually, Church’s 1940 paper introduced two higher-order logics. Both of these
logics are based on the same notion of term and formulas and use the same inference
rules—namely, βη-conversion, substitution, modus ponens, and ∀-generalization—but
use different sets of axioms. The first of Church’s logics is often called elementary
type theory (ETT) [7] and involves using only axioms 1-6 which include the axioms
for classical propositional logic as well as the basic rules for quantificational logic at
higher-order (simple) types. The second of Church’s logics is the aforementioned simple
theory of types (STT). This logic arises by adding to ETT the axiom of choice, the
existence of infinite sets, and the extensionality of functions (axioms 7-11 in [31]).
Church’s goal in strengthening ETT by adding these additional axioms was to position
STT as a proper foundation for much of mathematics. Indeed, formal developments of
significant parts of mathematics can be found in Andrews’s textbook [8] and in systems
such as HOL [64,70].
When we speak of dropping mathematics as an intermediate, it is at this point
that we wish to rewind the steps taken by Church (and implementers of some proof
assistants): for the task of mechanized metatheory, we wish to return to ETT and not
accept all of the mathematics oriented axioms.
3 Elementary type theory
ETT is an appealing starting place for its parsimony in addressing both bindings in
formulas (quantification) and bindings in terms by mapping them both to bindings in
the simply typed λ-calculus. It provides both support for (higher-order) quantification
as well as for terms containing bindings. In addition, the equality theory of ETT is that
of α, β, and η-conversion which means that both alphabetic changes of bound vari-
able names and capture-avoiding substitutions are all accounted for by the logical rules
underlying ETT. The proof theory for ETT has been well developed for both both intu-
itionistic and classical variants of ETT (Church’s original version was based on classical
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logic). Among the results know for ETT are cut-elimination [61,140,155], Herbrand’s
theorem and the soundness of Skolemization [91], completeness of resolution [6], and
unification [75]. Subsets and variants of ETT have been implemented and employed in
various computational logic systems. For example, the TPS theorem prover [105], the
core of the Isabelle theorem prover [121], the logic programming language λProlog [99],
and the proof system Minlog [147] are all based on various subsets of ETT. For more
about the history of the automation of ETT and STT see the handbook article [19].
The simple types in ETT are best thought of as syntactic categories and that
the arrow type γ → γ′ is the syntactic category of abstractions of category γ over
category γ′. Typing in this weak sense is essentially the same as Martin-Löf’s notion of
arity types [120]. In Church’s logic, the type o (omicron) is the type of formulas: other
primitive types provide for multisorted terms. For example, the universal quantifier
∀γ is not applied to a pair containing a variable of type γ and a formula (of type o)
but rather to an abstraction of type γ → o. Both ∀γ and ∃γ belong to the syntactic
category (γ → o) → o. When using ETT to encode some object-level language, the
terms and types of that language can be encoded as regular terms of two different
primitive types denoting the syntactic categories of object-level term and object-level
type.
Richer type systems, such as the dependently typed λ-calculi—known variously
as LF, λP , and λΠ [69,18]—are also important in a number of computational logic
systems, such as Coq [21], Agda [25], and Twelf [128]. Although we shall limit the
type system of our metalogic to be simple types, the intuitionistic variant of ETT is
completely capable of faithfully encoding such dependently typed calculi [43,151–153].
To be useful as the foundation of a mechanized metatheory, ETT needs extensions.
For example, ETT does not directly offer induction and coinduction which are both
clearly important for any logic hoping to prove metatheoretic results. Using a proof-
theoretic presentation of (the intuitionistic fragment of) ETT, Section 8 describes an
extension to ETT in which term equality is treated as a logical connective (following the
work by Schroeder-Heister [145] and Girard [62]) and inference rules for induction [89]
and coinduction [14,156,160] are added. Section 9 presents a further extension to ETT
with the addition of a generic quantifier [55,104,156].
In conclusion, we have explicitly ruled out Church’s extension of ETT to STT as a
proper foundation for specifying metatheory. Instead we shall illustrate that a separate
extension to ETT—based on introducing inference rules for equality, fixed points, and
∇-quantification—satisfy many of the needs for an expressible and implementable logic
for mechanizing metatheory. It is important to note that while STT is equipped to
deal with the mathematical notion of function (given the use of the definite description
choice operator and extensionality), the extensions to ETT we use here do not provide
a rich notion of function. Instead, relations are used to directly encode computations
and specifications. Of course, relations can encode functions: for example, the addition
of two natural numbers can be encoded by the relation belonging to the syntactic
category nat→ nat→ nat→ o (assuming that nat is a primitive type for which there
are the usual two constructors encoding zero and successor). In the weak setting of
ETT, the syntactic category nat → nat → nat does not contain the usual functional
notion of addition. Fortunately, metatheory abounds with relations that may or may
not be functional. For example, the following are all prominent relations in this setting:
a program and its types, a process and its transitions, and a formula and its proofs.
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4 How abstract is your syntax?
Two of the earliest formal treatments of the syntax of logical expressions were given
by Gödel [63] and Church [31] and, in both of these cases, their formalization involved
viewing formulas as strings of characters. Even in the 1970’s, one could find logicians
using strings as representations of formulas: for example, in [6], an atomic formula is
defined as a formula-cum-string in which the leftmost non-bracket primitive symbol
is a variable or parameter. Clearly, such a view of logical expressions contains too
much information that is not semantically meaningful (e.g., white space, infix/prefix
distinctions, brackets, parenthesis) and does not contain explicitly semantically relevant
information (e.g., the function-argument relationship). For this reason, those working
with syntactic expressions generally parse such expressions into parse trees: such trees
discard much that is meaningless (e.g., the infix/prefix distinction) and record directly
more meaningful information (e.g., the child relation denotes the function-argument
relation). The names of bound variables are one form of “concrete nonsense” that
generally remains in parse trees.
One way to get rid of bound variable names is to use de Bruijn’s nameless dummy
technique [36] in which (non-binding) occurrences of variables are replaced by positive
integers that count the number of bindings above the variable occurrence through which
one must move in order to find the correct binding site for that variable. While such
an encoding makes the check for α-conversion easy, it can greatly complicate other
operations, such as substitution, matching, and unification. While all such operations
can be supported and implemented using the nameless dummy encoding [36,83,116],
the bureaucracy needed to support that style of syntax clearly suggests that they are
best address within the implementation of a framework and not in the framework itself.
We list four principles about syntax that will guide our further discussion.
Principle 1: The names of bound variables should be treated in the same way
we treat white space: they are artifacts of how we write expressions and they
have no semantic content.
Of course, the name of variables are important for parsing and printing expressions (just
as is white space) but such names should not be part of the meaning of an expression.
This first principle simply repeats what we stated earlier. The second principle is a bit
more concrete.
Principle 2: All term-level and formula-level bindings are encoded using a
single binder.
With this principle, we are adopting Church’s approach [31] to binding in logic, namely,
that one has only λ-abstraction and all other bindings are encoded using that binder.
For example, the universally quantified expression (∀x.B x) is encoded as the expres-
sion (∀(λx.B x)), where ∀ is now treated as a constant of higher-type. Note that if B is
an expression not containing x free, then this latter expression is η-equivalent to (∀ B)
and universal instantiation of that quantified expression with the term t is simply the
result of using λ-normalization on the expression (B t). In this way, many details about
quantifiers can be reduced to details about λ-terms.
Principle 3: There is no such thing as a free variable.
This principle is Alan Perlis’s epigram 47 [124]. This principle acknowledges that every
variable and constant is actually declared somewhere, and that that location serves as
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its binding. This principle also suggests the following, which is the main novelty in this
list of principles.
Principle 4: Bindings have mobility and the equality theory of expressions
must support such mobility [95,99].
Since the first three principles are most likely familiar to the reader, we describe the
last principle in more detail in the next section.
5 Mobility of bindings
We now illustrate the mobility of bindings by showing first how term-level binders
can move to formula-level binders (quantifiers) and then move to proof-level binders
(eigenvariables). We also illustrate how binders can move within term structures via
simple rewriting.
5.1 Binder movement from terms to formulas to proofs
Gentzen’s sequents are useful for describing the search for a proof since they explicitly
maintain the “current set of assumptions and the current attempted consequence.”
For example, the sequent ∆ ` B is the judgment that states that B is a consequence
of the assumptions in ∆. A literal translation of Gentzen’s sequents makes use of free
variables. In particular, when attempting to prove a sequent with a universal quantifier
on the right, the corresponding right introduction rule employs an eigenvariable that
must be a “new” or “fresh” variable. For example, in the inference figure
B1, . . . , Bn ` B0[v/x]
B1, . . . , Bn ` ∀xγ .B0
∀R,
the variable v is not free in the lower sequent but it may be free in the upper sequent.
Gentzen called such new variables eigenvariables. Unfortunately, written this way, this
inference figure violates the Perlis principle (Principle 3 in Section 4). Instead, we
augment sequents with a prefix Σ that collects eigenvariables and binds them over the
sequent. The universal-right introduction rule now reads as
Σ, v : γ : B1, . . . , Bn ` B0[v/x]
Σ : B1, . . . , Bn ` ∀xγ .B0
∀R,
where we assume that the eigenvariable signature contains always distinct variables
(as is always possible given α-conversion for binding constructs). As a result, sequents
contain both assumptions and eigenvariables as well as the target goal to be proved.
Eigenvariables are sequent-level bindings. (A second kind of sequent-level binding will
be introduced in Section 9).
To illustrate the notion of binder mobility, consider specifying the typing rela-
tion that holds between untyped λ-terms and simple types. Since this problem deals
with the two syntactic categories of expressions, we introduce two primitive types: tm
is the type of terms encoding untyped λ-terms and ty is the type of terms encod-
ing simple type expressions. Untyped λ-terms can be specified using two constructors
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abs : (tm→ tm)→ tm and app : tm→ tm→ tm (note that there is no third construc-
tor for treating variables). Untyped λ-terms are encoded as terms of type tm using the
following translation function:
dxe = x, dλx.te = (abs (λx.dte)), and d(t s)e = (app dte dse).
The first clause here indicates that bound variables in untyped λ-terms are mapped to
bound variables in the encoding. For example, the untyped λ-term λw.ww is encoded as
(abs λw. app w w). This translation bijectively maps α-equivalence classes of untyped
λ-terms to αβη-equivalence classes of simply typed λ-terms of type tm: note that
such adequacy results traditionally use βη-long normal forms of type terms to encode
canonical term representations [69]. Scott’s encoding [148] of untyped λ-terms using a
certain domain D for which there were retracts between [D → D] and D is similar to
our syntactic encoding here: namely, the syntactic category tm plays the role of D and
the two constructors encode the two retracts abs : (tm → tm) → tm and app : tm →
(tm→ tm). Simple type expressions can be encoded by introducing two constants, say
i : ty and arrow : ty → ty → ty. Let of : tm → ty → o be the predicate encoding the
typing relation between untyped terms and simple types. (Following Church [31], we
use the type o as the type of formulas.)
The following inference rule is a plausible rule regarding typing.
Σ : ∆, of t (arrow i i) ` C
Σ : ∆,∀y(of t (arrow y y)) ` C ∀L
This rule states (when reading it from premise to conclusion) that if the formula C
follows from the assumption that t has type (arrow i i) then C follows from the stronger
assumption that t can be attributed the type (arrow y y) for all instances of y. In this
rule, the binding for y is instantiated: this inference rule is an example of Gentzen’s
rule for the introduction of the ∀ quantifier on the left.
The following formula can be used to specify what it means for a λ-abstraction to
have an arrow type.
∀B∀y∀y′[∀x(of x y ⊃ of (Bx) y′) ⊃ of (abs B) (arrow y y′)]. (∗)
Now consider the following combination of inference rules.
Σ, x : ∆, of dxe y ` of dBe y′
Σ : ∆ ` ∀x(of dxe y ⊃ of dBe y′)
∀R, ⊃ R
Σ : ∆ ` of dλx.Be (y → y′)
backchaining on (∗)
(Backchaining can be seen as a focused application of Gentzen-style inference rules
acting on a formula in ∆ [100]: we are assuming that the formula (∗) is a member of
∆.) These inferences illustrate how bindings can move during the construction of a
proof. In this case, the term-level binding for x in the lower sequent can be seen as
moving to the formula level binding for x in the middle sequent and then to the proof
level binding (as an eigenvariable) for x in the upper sequent. Thus, a binding is not
converted to a “free variable”: it simply moves.
This mobility of bindings needs support from the equality theory of expressions.
Clearly, equality already includes α-conversion by Property 1. As we shall now see, a
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small amount of β-conversion is also needed. Rewriting these last inference rules using
the definition of the d·e translation yields the following inference figures.
Σ, x : ∆, of x y ` of (B x) y′
Σ : ∆ ` ∀x(of x y ⊃ of (B x) y′)
∀R
Σ : ∆ ` of (abs B) (arrow y y′)
backchaining
Note that here B is a variable of arrow type tm → tm and that instances of these
inference figures will create an instance of (B x) that may be a β-redex: that β-
redex has, however, a greatly restricted form. Also observe that the alternation of
quantifiers implies that any instantiation of B leaves the β-redex (B x) in the state
where the argument x is not free in the instance of B: this is enforced by the fact that
substitutions into formulas do not capture bound variables. Thus, the only form of
β-conversion that is needed to support this notion of binding mobility is the so-called
β0-conversion [92], defined as (λy.t)x = t[x/y], provided that x is not free in λy.t. (Note
that this conversion is equivalent to (λx.t)x = t in the presence of α-conversion.)
Mobility of bindings is supported using β0 since the internally bound variable y in
the expression (λy.t)x is replaced by the externally bound variable x in the expression
t[x/y]. Note that β0 supports the following symmetric interpretation of λ-abstraction.
– If t is a term over the signature Σ ∪ {x} then λ-introduction yields the term λx.t
which is a term over the signature Σ.
– If λx.s is a term over the signature Σ then the β0-reduction of ((λx.s) y) is a
λ-elimination yielding [x/y]t, a term over the signature Σ ∪ {y}.
Thus, β0-reduction provides λ-abstraction with a rather weak form of functional in-
terpretation: given a λ-abstraction and an increment to a signature, β0 yields a term
over the extended signature. The λ-abstraction has a dual interpretation since it takes
a term over an incremented signature and hides that increment.
5.2 Binder movement within terms
To further illustrate how β0 conversion supports the mobility of binders, consider how
one specifies the following rewriting rule: given a universally quantified conjunction,
rewrite it to be the conjunction of two universally quantified formulas. In this setting,
we would write something like
(∀(λx.(A x ∧B x))) 7→ (∀(λx.A x)) ∧ (∀(λx.B x)),
where A and B are schema variables. To rewrite an expression such as (∀λz(p z z ∧
q a z)) (where p, q, and a are constants), we first need to use β0-expansion to get the
expression
(∀λz[((λw. p w w)z) ∧ ((λw. q a w)z)]).
At this point, the variables A and B in the rewriting rule can be instantiated by the
terms λw. p w w and λw. q a w, respectively, which yields the rewritten expression
(∀(λx.(λw. p w w) x)) ∧ (∀(λx.(λw. q a w) x)).
Finally, a β0-reduction yields the expected expression (∀λx. p x x)∧ (∀λx. q a x). Note










































Fig. 1 Moving from (1) to (2) involves β0-expansions; moving from (2) to (3) involves a
replacing a λ-abstracted term; and moving from (3) to (4) involves β0-reduction. Here, @
denotes application nodes.
Figure 1 graphically illustrates this process of rewriting in the presence of bindings.
Assume that we have a closed term (illustrated in (1) of Figure 1 as a large triangle)
and that we wish to replace an open subterm (the dark gray triangle) with another term
(the light gray triangle in image (4)). Since the subterm in (1) contains occurrences of
two bound variables, we write that subterm as t(x, y) (where we assign the names x
and y to those two bindings). When moving from image (1) to (2), we use β0-expansion
to replace t(x, y) with (λuλv.t(u, v))xy. Note that the subterm λuλv.t(u, v) is closed
and, as a result, it can be rewritten to, say, λuλv.s(u, v) (yielding (3)). Finally, β0-
reduction yields the term illustrated in (4). Thus, β0-expansion and reduction allows a
subterm be released from its dependency on bindings in its environment by changing
those dependencies into local bound variables. Of course, instead of simply rewriting
the open term t to the open term s, we needed to rewrite the closed abstraction
λuλv.t(u, v) to the closed abstraction λuλv.s(u, v).
6 Proof search provides a framework
From a proof-theoretic perspective, formal reasoning can be seen as a process that
builds a (sequent calculus) proof. The cut rule (the use of both modus ponens and
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lemmas) is a dominate inference rule when reasoning is seen in this fashion [57]. The
proof search approach to computation [100] can also be seen as building sequent cal-
culus proofs that do not contain the cut rule. In general, cut-elimination is not part
of these approaches to computation or reasoning. With the growing use of formal sys-
tems to encode aspects of mathematical reasoning, there are starting to appear some
applications of cut-elimination within the reasoning process: consider, for example,
proof mining where formal proofs can be manipulated to extract mathematically use-
ful information [80]. In section 11, we shall provide a different set of examples where
cut-elimination is used to formally reason about computations specified using the proof-
search paradigm.
One of the appealing aspects of using proof search to describe computation and
reasoning is that it is possible to give a rich account of binder mobility (as illustrated
in Section 5). Thus, this paradigm allows for specifying recursive programming over
data with bindings as well as inductive reasoning about such specifications. As such,
proof search within ETT (even when restricted to not allow predicate quantification)
can accommodate all four principles dealing with abstract syntax that were listed in
Section 4.
We shall refer to computation-as-cut-free-proof-search as the logic programming
paradigm, following the foundations developed in [100]. The use of this term is not
intended to be narrowed to specific implementations of logic programming, such as
Prolog or λProlog: for example, both of those languages make use of depth-first search
even though such a search regime is often inappropriate for general logic programs.
The use of logic programming principles in proof assistants pushes against usual
practice: since the first LCF prover [65], many proof assistants have had intimate
ties to functional programming. Furthermore, many theorem provers view proofs con-
structively in the sense that computational content of proofs can be translated into
executable functional programs [20].
Most of the remainder of this paper provides an argument and some evidence that
the proof search paradigm is an appropriate and appealing setting for mechanizing
metatheory. Our focus will be on the specification of mechanized metatheory tasks
and not on their implementation: it is completely possible that logic programming
principles are used in specifications while a functional programming language is used
to implement that specification language (for example, current implementations of
λProlog and Abella are written in OCaml [1,40,141]).
6.1 Expressions versus values
Keeping with the theme mentioned in Section 2 that types denote syntactic categories,
the terms of logic should then denote expressions. If we are representing expressions
without bindings, then expressions denote themselves, in the sense of free algebras: for
example, the equality 3 = 1+2 fails to hold because the equality is placed between two
different expressions. While this is a standard expectation in the logic programming
paradigm, the functional programming paradigm recognizes this equality as holding
since, in that paradigm, expressions do not denote themselves but their value. That is,
in the functional programming paradigm, if we wish to speak of expressions, we would
need to introduce a datatype for abstract syntax (e.g., parse trees) and then one would
have different expressions for “three” and for “one plus two.”
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The treatment of syntax with bindings within the functional programming paradigm
is generally limited to two different approaches. First, binders in syntax can be mapped
to function abstractions: thus, abstract syntax may contain functions. More about
this approach appears in Section 7. Second, one can build datatypes to denote syntax
trees using different representations of bindings, such as strings-as-variable-names or de
Bruijn’s nameless dummies [36]. The implementer of such a datatype would also need
to encode notions such as α-equality, free/bound distinctions, and capture-avoiding
substitution. Such an approach to encoding syntax with bindings is usually challenged
when attempting to treat Principles 3 and 4 of Section 4. In order to support the
notion that there are no free variables, contexts must be introduced and used as de-
vices for encoding bindings: such bindings usually become additional data-structures
and additional arguments and technical devices that must be treated with care. With
its formal treatment of contexts (based on Contextual Model Type Theory [117]), the
Beluga programming language [129] represents the state-of-the-art in this approach to
syntax.
The logic programming paradigm with its emphasis on expressions instead of val-
ues provides another approach to treating syntax containing bindings that simply in-
volves adopting an equality theory on expressions. In particular, by supporting both
α-conversion and β0-conversion it is possible for both Principle 1 and 4 to be supported.
It has been know since the late 1980’s that the logic programming paradigm can sup-
port the theory of α, η, and full β–conversions and, as such, it can support a suitably
abstract approach to syntax with bindings: for example, the systems λProlog [99,114],
Twelf [128], and Isabelle [122] provide such a proof search based approach to abstract
syntax. While unification of simply typed λ-terms modulo αβη is undecidable in gen-
eral [74], the systematic search for unifiers has been described [75]. It is also known
that within the higher-order pattern unification restriction, unification modulo αβ0η is
not only decidable and unary but it is also complete for unification modulo αβη [92].
This restricted form of unification is all that is needed to automatically support the
kind of term processing illustrated in Figure 1.
6.2 Dominance of relational specifications
The focus of most efforts to mechanize metatheory is to build tools that make it possible
to prove various properties of entire programming languages or specification languages
(such as the λ-calculus and the π-calculus). The static semantics of such languages
is usually presented as typing systems. Their dynamic semantics is usually presented
as either small step semantics, such as is used in structural operational semantics
(SOS) [134], or as big step semantics, such as is used in natural semantic [77]. In all of
these styles of semantic specifications, relations and not functions are the direct target
of specifications. For example, the specification of proof systems and type systems use
binary predicates such as Ξ ` B or T : γ. A binary relation, such as M ⇓ V , is also
used when specifying the evaluation of, say, a functional program M to a value V . In
case it holds that evaluation is a (partial) function, then it is a metatheorem that
∀M ∀V ∀V ′ [M ⇓ V ∧M ⇓ V ′ ⊃ V = V ′]


































−−→ P ′ |Q′
Fig. 2 Some of the rules defining the labeled transitions for CCS. Tokens starting with a
capital letter are schematic variables.
kind proc , act type.
type tau act.
type bar act -> act.
type plus , par proc -> proc -> proc.
type one proc -> act -> proc -> o.
one (plus P Q) A P’ :- one P A P’.
one (plus P Q) A Q’ :- one Q A Q’.
one (par P Q) A (par P’ Q) :- one P A P’.
one (par P Q) A (par P Q’) :- one Q A Q’.
one (par P Q) tau (par P’ Q’) :- one P A P’, one Q (bar A) Q’.
Fig. 3 The logic programming specification of SOS rules for CCS, written using the syntax
of λProlog [99]. Here, the kind keyword declares proc and act as two syntactic categories
denoting processes and actions, respectively. Tokens starting with a capital letter are variables
that are universally quantified around the individual clauses.
For a concrete example, consider the small step semantic specification of CCS [106]
which is usually given by defining the ternary relation of labeled transition systems
P
a
−−→ Q between two processes P and Q and an action a. Figure 2 contains an SOS
specification of the labeled transitions for CCS using inference rules. The connection
between those inference rules and logic programming clauses is transparent: in partic-
ular, those inference rules can be written naturally as the logic programming clauses
in Figure 3. The close connection between such semantic specifications and logic pro-
gramming allows for the immediate animation of such specifications using common
logic programming interpreters. For example, both typing judgments and SOS speci-
fications have been animated via a Prolog interpreter in the Centaur project [33] and
via a λProlog interpreter for computational systems employing binders [9,67,99].
The connection between semantic specifications and logic programs goes further
than mere animation. Such logic programs can be taken as formal specifications which
can then be used to prove properties about the computational systems they specify. For
example, logic programs have been systematically transformed in meaning preserving
ways in order to prove that a certain abstract machine implements a certain functional
programming language [68]. Logic programs can also be used to specify and animate
sophisticated transformations of functional programs such as closure conversion, code
hoisting, and CPS transformations [172]. The Twelf system provided automated tools
for reasoning about certain logic programs, thereby allowing direct proofs of, for ex-
ample, progress theorems and type preservation [127,146]. A systematic approach to
reasoning about logic programming specifications in Abella is described in Section 11.
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6.3 Trading side conditions for more expressive logics
The inference rules used to specify both static semantics (e.g., typing) and dynamic
semantics (e.g., small-step and big-step operational semantics) often contain an assort-
ment of side conditions. Such side conditions can break and obscure the declarative
nature of specifications: their presence can signal that a more expressive logical frame-
work for specifications could be used.
The inference rules in Figure 2 for describing the transition system for CCS have no
side conditions and their mapping into first-order Horn clauses (Figure 3) is unproblem-
atic. Consider, however, some simple specifications regarding the untyped λ-calculus.
The specification of call-by-value evaluation for untyped λ-terms can be written as
M ⇓ λx.R N ⇓ U S ⇓ V
(M N) ⇓ V
provided S = R[U/x].
There, the side condition requires that S is the result of substituting U for the free
variable x in R. Similarly, when specifying a typing discipline on untyped λ-terms, we
typically see specifications such as
Γ, x : γ ` t : σ
Γ ` λx.t : γ → σ provided x /∈ fv(Γ ).
Here, the side condition specifies that the variable x is not free the context Γ . In systems
such as the π-calculus, which includes sophisticated uses of bindings, transition system





provided y 6= x, w /∈ fv((y)P ′).
Here the side condition has two conditions on variable names appearing in that infer-
ence rule.
We will illustrate in Sections 8 and 10.2 how the side conditions in the inference rules
above can all be eliminated simply by encoding those rules in a logic richer than first-
order Horn clauses. In particular, the logic underlying λProlog, the hereditary Harrop
formulas [100], provide an immediate specification of these rules, in part, because
the intuitionistic logic theory of hereditary Harrop formulas directly supports binder
mobility and rich quantified expressions.
6.4 Substitution lemmas for free
One of the reasons to use a logic to formalize static and dynamic semantic specifications
is that that formalism can have significant formal properties of its own. For example,
proof search as a computation paradigm usually constructs cut-free proofs. A famous
metatheorem of intuitionistic logic is the cut-elimination theorem of Gentzen [57]: if
properly used, the cut-elimination theorem can be seen as the “mother of all substitu-
tion lemmas.” An example of a substitution lemma is the following: if λx.B has type
γ → γ′ and N has type γ then the result of substituting N for x in B, i.e., [N/x]B,
has type γ′. To illustrate this claim, we return to the specification of the of predicate
given in Section 5. This binary relation relates the syntactic categories tm (for untyped
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λ-terms) and, say, ty (for simple type expressions). The logical specification of the of
predicate might attribute integer type or list type to different expressions: for example,
the following clause specifies typing for the non-empty list constructor ::.
∀T : tm ∀L : tm ∀y : ty [of T y ⊃ of L (list y) ⊃ of (T :: L) (list y)].
Consider an attempt to prove the sequent Σ : ∆ ` of (abs R) (t → t′) where the
assumptions (the theory) contains only one rule for typing an abstraction and that
this assumption is the clause (∗) from Section 5. Since the introduction rules for ∀ and
⊃ are invertible, the sequent above is provable if and only if the sequent
Σ, x : ∆, of x t ` of (R x) t′
is provable. Given that we are committed to using a proper logic (such as intuitionistic
logic), it is the case that instantiating an eigenvariable in a provable sequent yields a
provable sequent. Thus, the sequent Σ : ∆, of N t ` of (R N) t′ must be provable.
Thus, we have just shown, using nothing more than rather simple properties of logic
that if
Σ : ∆ ` of (abs B) (t→ t′) and Σ : ∆ ` of N t
then (using modus ponens) Σ : ∆ ` of (B N) t′. (Of course, instances of the term
(B N) can be β-redexes and the reduction of such redexes results in the substitution
of N into the bound variable of the term that instantiates B.) Such lemmas about
substitutions are common and often difficult to prove [5,168]: in this setting, this lemma
is essentially an immediate consequent of using logic and logic programming principles.
In Section 11, we illustrate how the two-level logic approach [56,90] implemented in
the Abella theorem prover provides a general methodology that explicitly uses the
cut-elimination theorem in this fashion.
7 λ-tree syntax
The term higher-order abstract syntax (HOAS) was originally defined as an approach
to syntax that used “a simply typed λ-calculus enriched with products and polymor-
phism” [126].1 It seems that few researchers currently use this term in a setting that in-
cludes products and polymorphism (although simple and dependently typed λ-calculus
are often used). A subsequent paper identified HOAS as a technique “whereby variables
of an object language are mapped to variables in the metalanguage” [128]. While this
definition of HOAS seems the dominating one in the literature, this term is problematic
for at least two reasons.
First, the adjective “higher-order” is both ambiguous (see [99, Section 1.3]) and
unnecessary. In particular, the underlying notions of binder mobility and unification of
terms discussed in Section 5 is valid without reference to typing and it is the order of
a type that usually determines whether or not a variable is first-order or higher-order.
When it comes to unification, in particular, it seems more appropriate to view pattern
unification as a mild extension to first-order unification (which can be described without
reference to types [92, Section 9.3]) than it is to view it as an extreme restriction to
1 The reader who is not familiar with the term HOAS can safely skip to the last paragraph
of this section.
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“higher-order unification” (which, in general, requires knowing the types of variables).
Thus, if types are not essential, why retain the adjective “higher-order”?
Second, this definition of HOAS is fundamentally ambiguous since the metalan-
guage (often the programming language) can vary a great deal. For example, if the
metalanguage is a functional programming language or an intuitionistic type theory,
the binding in syntax is usually mapped to the binding available for defining functions.
In this setting, HOAS representation of syntax incorporates function spaces in expres-
sions [37,71]. If the metalanguage is a logic programming language such as λProlog
or Twelf, then the λ-abstraction available in those languages does not correspond to
function spaces but to the weaker notion of hiding variables within a term, thereby
producing a term of an abstracted syntactic type (see Section 2).
Referring to these different approaches to encoding syntax with the same expression
leads to misleading statements in the literature, such as the following.
– The authors of [49] say that HOAS’s “big drawback, in its original form at least,
is that one looses the ability to define functions on syntax by structural recursion
and to prove properties by structural induction—absolutely essential tools for our
intended applications to operational semantics.”
– In [142, p. 365], we find the statement that “higher-order abstract syntax used in
a shallow embedding” when applied to “the π-calculus have been studied in Coq
and λProlog. Unfortunately, higher-order datatypes are not recursive in a strict
sense, due to the function in the continuations of binders. As a consequence, plain
structural induction does not work, making syntax-analysis impossible. Even worse,
in logical frameworks with object-level constructors, so-called exotic terms can be
derived.” Similar problems claimed about HOAS can also be found in [72,85].
If not read carefully, these negative conclusions about HOAS can be interpreted as
applying to all methods of encoding object-level bindings into a metalevel binding.
Since most higher-order languages allow functions to be defined with conditionals and
recursion, syntax encoded with functions have “exotic” items (combinators related to
conditionals and recursive definitions) injected into that syntax. While exotic terms
can appear in Coq encodings [37], they are not possible in λProlog since it contains
neither function spaces nor combinators for building functions using conditionals and
recursion.
The term “λ-tree syntax” was introduced in [102] to avoid this ambiguous term.
With its obvious parallel to the term “parse tree syntax,” this term names an ap-
proach to the syntactic representation described in the previous sections that relies on
the notions of syntactic-categories-as-types, αβ0η-conversion, and mobility of bindings.
In particular, λ-tree syntax is the form of HOAS available in the logic programming
languages λProlog and Twelf. In both of those languages, it has long been known
how to write relational specifications that compute by recursion over the syntax of ex-
pressions containing bindings. At the end of the 1990’s, explicit reasoning about such
relational specifications was part of the Twelf project [128] and was being developed
for λProlog specifications following the “two-level logic approach” [88,90]. The Abella
proof assistant was designed, in part, to reasoning about relational specifications: that
prover is routinely used to prove inductive and coinductive theorems involving λ-tree
syntax (see [15,51,56]). Abella is described in more detail in Section 11. Furthermore,
various model-theoretic approaches to HOAS and λ-tree syntax are available: for exam-
ple, Kripke-style models are used in [93,111] while a category of (covariant) presheaves
is used in [48]. Finally, a couple of functional programming languages, namely, Bel-
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uga [129] and MLTS [60], have been designed that introduce a binding construct that
directly supports λ-tree syntax.
8 Computing and reasoning with λ-tree syntax
The proof theory of the intuitionistic version of ETT with higher-order (but not pred-
icate) quantification provides a rich computational setting for the direct manipulation
of λ-tree syntax. This section illustrates this claim.
8.1 Relational specifications using λ-tree syntax
A common method to specify the call-by-value evaluation of untyped λ-terms is using
natural semantics [77] (also known as big-step semantics). For example, the following
two inference rules (of which the second was already mentioned in Section 6.3)
λx.R ⇓ λx.R
M ⇓ λx.R N ⇓ U S ⇓ V
(M N) ⇓ V
provided S = R[N/x]
are commonly taken to be the definition of the binary relation · ⇓ · which relates
two untyped λ-terms exactly when the second is the value (following the call-by-value
strategy for reduction) of the first. Note that the rule for evaluating an application
involves a side condition that refers to a (capture-avoiding) substitution.
Using the encoding in Section 5.1 of the untyped λ-calculus, the inference rules
displayed above can be written as
abs R ⇓ abs R
M ⇓ (abs R) N ⇓ U (R U) ⇓ V
(app M N) ⇓ V
In these inference rules, the schematic variables M , N , U , and V have type tm while
the schematic variable R has type tm → tm. Note that the side condition involving
substitution, written as S = R[N/x] above, has been removed and the application
(R N) appears instead. Since the equality theory of ETT contains β-conversion, in-
stances of the term (R U) are β-redexes if the instance of R is an abstraction. In that
case, the result of performing a β-reduction would result in the formal substitution
of the argument U into the abstracted variable of R, thereby correctly implement-
ing the substitution proviso of the first pair of displayed inference rules above. These
two inference rules are encoded naturally in intuitionistic logic as the following Horn
clauses.
∀R (eval (abs R) (abs R))
∀M∀N∀U∀V ∀R (eval M (abs R) ∧ eval N U ∧ eval (R U) V ⊃ eval (app M N) V )
Here, the infix notation · ⇓ · is replaced by the prefixed symbol eval and the type of
the quantified variables M , N , U , V , and R is the same as when they were used as
schematic variables above. The λProlog syntax for this specification is given in Figure 4:
here kinds and types are explicitly declared and several standard logic programming
conventions are used to displayed Horn clauses (upper case letters denote variables that
are universally quantified around the full clause, conjunctions are written as a comma,
and implication is written as :- denoting “implied-by”).
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kind tm type.
type abs (tm -> tm) -> tm.
type app tm -> tm -> tm.
type eval tm -> tm -> o.
eval (abs R) (abs R).
eval (app M N) V :- eval M (abs R), eval N U, eval (R U) V.
Fig. 4 The kind and type declarations and the logic program clauses specifying call-by-value
evaluation for the untyped λ-calculus.
type copy tm -> tm -> o.
type subst (tm -> tm) -> tm -> tm -> o.
copy (app M N) (app P Q) :- copy M P, copy N Q.
copy (abs M) (abs N) :- pi x\ copy x x => copy (M x) (N x).
subst M T S :- pi x\ copy x T => copy (M x) S.
Fig. 5 A relational specification of object-level substitution.
8.2 A specification of object-level substitution and its correctness proof
As was illustrated above, the presence of β-conversion in ETT (and λProlog) makes
it immediate to encode object-level substitution. Such substitution can be specified
without reference to full β-conversion using only relational specifications and binder
mobility. In particular, Figure 5 contains the specification of two predicates that can be
used to capture such substitution. That figure makes use of three additional λProlog
conventions: the backslash denotes λ-abstraction; pi denotes the logical constant for
encoding universal quantification; and => denotes implication. Following Church [31],
the expression pi x\ denotes the universal quantification of the variable x.
In isolation, the copy predicate encodes equality in the following sense. Let C denote
the set of clauses in Figure 5. The judgment C ` copyM N is provable if and only if M
and N are equal (that is, βη-convertible). The forward direction of this theorem can be
proved by a simple induction on the uniform proof [100] of the judgment C ` copyM N .
The converse is proved by induction on the structure of the βη-long normal form of
terms of type tm. If the copy predicate is used hypothetically, as in the specification
of the subst relation, then it can be used to specify substitution. The following is
an immediate (and informal) proof of the following correctness statement for subst:
C ` subst R M N is provable if and only if N is equal to the βη-long normal form
of (R M). The proof of the converse direction is, again, done by induction on the βη-
long form of M (of type tm → tm). The forward direction has an even more direct
proof: the only way one can prove C ` subst R M N is to prove C, copy x M `
copy (R x) N , where x is a new eigenvariable. Since instantiating an eigenvariable in a
sequent with any term of the same type yields another provable sequent, then we know
that C, copy M M ` copy (R M) N is provable. By the previous theorem about copy,
we also know that C ` copy M M holds and by the cut rule of the sequent calculus
(modus ponens), we know that C ` copy (R M) N is provable which means (using
again the theorem about copy) that N is equal to (R M).
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kind ty type.
type i, j ty. % Examples of primitive types
type arr ty -> ty -> ty. % The arrow type
type of tm -> ty -> o.
of (app M N) A :- of M (arr B A), of N B.
of (abs R) (arr A B) :- pi x\ of x A => of (R x) B.
Fig. 6 A relational specification of object-level typing.
One of the keys to reasoning about relational specifications using logical specifica-
tions is the central use of sequent calculus judgments. For example, in the argument
above, we did not attempt to reason by induction on the provability of ` copy M N
but rather on the provability of the sequent Γ ` copy M N for suitable context Γ .
8.3 The open-world and closed-world perspectives
As previous examples have illustrated, the specification of atomic formulas, such as
of M N and copy M N, assume the open world assumption. For example, in order to
prove copy (abs R) (abs S) from assumptions C, the process of searching for a proof
generates a new member (an eigenvariable) of the type tm, say c, and adds the formula
copy c c to the set of assumptions C. Thus, we view the type tm and the theory (the
logic program) about members of that type as expandable. Such an open world perspec-
tive is common in relational specification languages that manipulate λ-tree syntax [69,
99,100,128].
The open-world perspective to specifications has, however, a serious problem: in
that setting, it is not generally possible to prove interesting negations. Figure 6 contains
the λProlog specification of simple typing of untyped λ-terms. Note that the second
clause in that figure encodes the formula (∗) in Section 5.1. Given those clauses, one
would certainly want to prove that self-application in the untyped λ-calculus does not
have a simple typing: for example, our metalogic should be strong enough to prove
Σ : P ` ¬ ∃y : ty. of (abs λx (app x x)) y,
where Σ is a signature (containing at least the type declarations in Figures 4 and 6)
and P is the specification of the (of · ·) predicate in Figure 6. However, the inference
rules of the intuitionistic logic principles that we have motivated so far are not strong
enough to prove this negation: such a proof requires the use of induction.
The contrast to the open-world perspective is the familiar closed-world perspective.
Consider proving the theorem ∀n[ fib(n) = n2 ⊃ n ≤ 20 ], where fib(n) is the nth
Fibonacci number. Of course, we do not attempt a proof by assuming the existence of
a new (non-standard) natural number n for which the Fibonacci value is n2. Instead,
we prove that among the (standard) natural numbers, we find that there are only three
values of n (0, 1, and 12) such that fib(n) = n2 and that all three of those values are
less than 20. The set of natural numbers is closed and induction allows us to prove
such theorems about them.
Thus, it seems that in order to prove theorems about λ-tree syntax, we need both
the open-world and the close-world perspectives: the trick is, of course, discovering how
it is possible to accommodate these two conflicting perspectives at the same time.
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8.4 Induction, coinduction, and λ-tree syntax
Since any formalization of metatheory needs to include induction and coinduction
reasoning principles, we shall assume that these should be part of the logic we are
using for reasoning. There are many ways to provide schemes for least and greatest
fixed points within a proof theory setting. Gentzen used the familiar invariant-based
induction rule to encode Peano arithmetic and to prove its consistency [58]. Both
Schroeder-Heister [145] and Girard [62] considered sequent calculi that allowed for
the unfolding of fixed point expressions but neither of them considered the problem
of capturing least and greatest fixed points. Proof systems for intuitionistic and linear
logics containing induction and coinduction were developed in a series of papers [14,55,
89,156,160]. For the rest of this paper, we assume that the metalogic is an intuitionistic
logic with inference rules for induction and coinduction. The logic G in [55] is an
intuitionistic logic with induction and coinduction that can be used as such a metalogic.
While we shall not describe the proof theory of that logic in detail here, we mention
the following.
– Inductive and coinductive definitions generally need to be stratified in some manner
so that cut-elimination can be proved and, as a consequence, the full logic is shown
to be consistent.
– Inductive and coinductive definitions are encoded not as a theory or set of assump-
tions but as either auxiliary components to a sequent calculus [89,145] or as term
structures via µ- and ν-expressions [14,17].
Given that we have adopted these strong principles in the logic, the closed-world
perspective is enforced. We can recover the open-world perspective in this setting by
following two steps. First, the∇ (nabla) quantifier (described in Section 9) reintroduces
the notion of generic quantification. Second, the two-level logic approach to reasoning
(described in Section 11) allows us to embed within our (closed world) reasoning logic
an inductive data structure which encodes the sequent calculus of the specification logic
that permits the open world perspective.
9 The ∇-quantifier
Consider the following problem (taken from [103]) about reasoning with an object-logic.
Let H be the set containing the following three (quantified) formulas.
∀x∀y (q x x y), ∀x∀y (q x y x), ∀x∀y (q y x x)
Here, q is a predicate constant of three arguments. The sequent
H ` ∀u∀v (q 〈u, t1〉 〈v, t2〉 〈v, t3〉)
is provable (in either Gentzen’s LJ or LK sequent calculus [57]) only if terms t2 and t3
are equal. If we use curly brackets to denotes the provability of object-level sequents,
then this statement about object-level provability can be formalized as
∀t1∀t2∀t3
(
{H ` ∀u∀v[q 〈u, t1〉 〈v, t2〉 〈v, t3〉]} ⊃ t2 = t3
)
.
Since object-level sequent calculus provability is inductively defined, one should be
able to explicitly write a meta-level definition for {P ` G} that captures object-level
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provability of the sequent P ` G. When writing such a definition, one can imagine
trying to treat the object-level universal quantifier as a metalevel universal quantifier,
as in the following formula.
∀t1∀t2∀t3
(
[∀u∀v{H ` (q 〈u, t1〉 〈v, t2〉 〈v, t3〉)}] ⊃ t2 = t3
)
This second formula is only provable, however, if there are at least two different mem-
bers of the underlying object-level type. That approach to proving this second formula
is unfortunate since the original formula is provable without any assumptions about
the inhabitants of the object-level types. Thus, it seems to be a mistake to reduce the
object-level universal quantifier to the metalevel universal quantifier.




This inference rule violates the Perlis principle (Principle 3 in Section 4) since occur-
rences of x in the premise are free. If we fix this violation by inserting the universal
quantifier into the rule
∀x (t = s)
λx.t = λx.s
then the equivalence ∀x (t = s) ≡ (λx.t = λx.s) can be proved. As argued in Section 2,
this equivalence is problematic for λ-tree syntax since we want ∀w ¬(λx.x = λx.w) to
be provable because it is impossible for there to be a (capture-avoiding) substitution
for w into λx.w that results in the term λx.x. However, since this latter formula is
equivalent to ∀w ¬∀x (x = w) this (first-order) formula cannot be proved since it is
false for a first-order model with a singleton domain.
The ∇-quantifier [103,104] provides an elegant logical treatment of these two exam-
ples. While this new quantifier can informally be described as providing a formalization
of “newness” and “freshness” in a proof system, it is possible to describe it more for-
mally using the mobility-of-binders theme. In particular, sequents are generalized from
having one global signature (the familiar Σ) to also having several local signatures,
Σ : σ1 . B1, . . . , σn . Bn ` σ0 . B0,
where σi is a list of variables, locally scoped over the formula Bi. The expression σi . Bi
is called a generic judgment. The ∇-introduction rules moves a formula-level binding
to a generic judgment-level binding (when reading these proof rules from conclusion to
premise).
Σ : (σ, xγ) . B, Γ ` C
Σ : σ . ∇xγ .B, Γ ` C
∇L
Σ : Γ ` (σ, xγ) . B
Σ : Γ ` σ . ∇xγ .B
∇R
In these rules, the variable x is assumed to not occur in the local signature to which it
is added: such an assumption is always possible since α-conversion is available for all
term, formula, and sequent-level bindings. The generic judgment (x1, . . . , xn) . t = s
can be identified, at least informally, with the generic judgment . ∇x1 · · ·∇xn.(t = s)
and with the formula ∇x1 · · ·∇xn.(t = s). Since these introduction rules are the same
on the left and the right, one expects that this quantifier is self-dual. Instead of listing
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all the other inference rules for formulas using this extended sequent, we simply note
that the following equivalences involving logical connectives hold as well.
∇x¬Bx ≡ ¬∇xBx ∇x(Bx ∧ Cx) ≡ ∇xBx ∧∇xCx
∇x(Bx ∨ Cx) ≡ ∇xBx ∨∇xCx ∇x(Bx⇒ Cx) ≡ ∇xBx⇒ ∇xCx
∇x∀yBxy ≡ ∀h∇xBx(hx) ∇x∃yBxy ≡ ∃h∇xBx(hx)
∇x∀yBxy ⇒ ∀y∇xBxy ∇x.> ≡ >, ∇x.⊥ ≡ ⊥
Note that the scope of a∇ quantifier can be moved in over all propositional connectives.
Moving it’s scope below the universal and existential quantifier requires the familiar
notion of raising [94]: that is, the when ∇ moves inside a quantified expression, the
type of the quantified variable must be raised by the type of the ∇-quantified variable.
While they are formally different, the ∇-quantification is similar to the Gabbay
and Pitt’s freshness quantifier [50]: they are both self dual, i.e., ∇x¬Bx ≡ ¬∇xBx,
and in weak settings (roughly Horn clauses), they coincide [53].
The ∇-quantifier is the missing quantifier for formulating the ξ-rule: that is, the
rule can now be written as
∇x (t = s)
λx.t = λx.s
.
Thus, the formulas ∇x1 · · ·∇xn (t = s) and (λx1 . . . λxn.t) = (λx1 . . . λxn.s) are
provably equivalent. This treatment of the ξ-rule using ∇ appears to be similar to
the semantic treatment of that rule using lambda algebras with indeterminates given
in [149]. Using this inference rule, the following three formulas are equivalent.
∀w ¬(λx.x = λx.w) ∀w ¬∇x (x = w) ∀w ∇x (x 6= w).
Furthermore, all of these formulas are provable.
In general, ∇ does not imply ∀: that is, (∇x.Bx) ⊃ (∀x.Bx) is not generally
provable. For example, assume that i is a primitive type and a and b are two constants
of type i. The formula∇x (x 6= a) ⊃ ∀x (x 6= a) is not provable since clearly∇x (x 6= a)
is provable while ∀x (x 6= a) is not true. It is, however, the case that in certain settings
∇ does imply ∀: an important example of such a theorem is presented in Section 11.
Full details of sequent calculi involving ∇-quantification are provided elsewhere
(see, [55,104]). While we do not present the full sequent calculus rules here, we shall
focus on the rules that actually complete a proof (i.e., rules with no premises). For
example, the leaves of a sequent calculus proof might involve either the > on the right-
hand-side or ⊥ on the left-hand-side. There are two other possible leaves. The one
involving equality would contain the generic judgment (x1, . . . , xn) . t = s which can
be viewed as just another way to write the equality λx1 · · ·λxn.t = λx1 · · ·λxn.s. The
final possibility involves a generalization of the initial rule: In particular, when is a
sequent of the form Σ : Γ, σ . A ` σ′ . A′ to be considered initial. There seems to be
two natural approaches to defining the initial rule in the presence of generic judgments.
Minimal approach One approach declares Σ : Γ, (x1, . . . , xn) . A ` (y1, . . . , ym) . A′
to be initial exactly when λx1 · · ·λxn.A and λy1 · · ·λym.A′ are λ-convertible. Such a
definition seems too strong, however, since the order of variables in two different local
context does not seem important: in particular, it would seem natural that ∇x∇y.B
should be logically equivalent to ∇y∇x.B. Adopting this additional interchange prin-
ciple is called the minimal approach and was used and analyzed in [13]. In that setting,
local signature contexts are allowed to exchange the order of their variables.
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Nominal approach Besides exchange, it might also seem natural to allow a form of
strengthening: that is, to allow the equivalence of∇x.B with B whenever x is not free in
B. A consequence of such an equivalence is that all types are non-empty. For example,
the formula ∃xi.B is not provable if the type i does not contain any inhabitants.
However, the formula ∇yi∃xi.B might be provable: there is, at least, one inhabitant of
type i, namely, the nominal y. This kind of argument can easily be generalized to show
that this strengthening equivalence implies that types for which one uses ∇ necessarily
contain an infinite number of members. Baelde has argued [13] that certain adequacy
issues can be complicated when strengthening is allowed and Gacek has described how
to address most of those issues [52, Section 4.2]. The strengthening principle has been
formally studied [54,52,55,158] and implemented in the Abella theorem prover [15].
The nominal approach also allows for a different way of writing local (generic) contexts
within sequents. Via the strengthening rule, all local contexts can have the same number
of variables (just add more variables to those local contexts that are shorter than the
local context of maximum length). Furthermore, all contexts can use the same variable
names (using α-conversion). In such a setting, then, instead of writing the many local
signatures that are now all the same, we can write that local signature as if it is
global (although acting locally). Such a convention is taken, for example, in displaying
sequents within the Abella prover.
10 The Abella proof assistant
Most of the proof theory principles and logic designs that we have motivated so far are
implemented in the Abella interactive theorem prover. First implemented by Gacek
in 2009 as part of his PhD [52], this prover has attracted a number of users and
additional developers. Abella is written in OCaml and the most recent versions of
the system are available via GitHub and OPAM [1]. A tutorial appears in [15]. The
logical foundation that is closest to that which is implemented is the logic G in [55].
The approach to induction and coinduction in Abella differs significantly from that
based on proof theory: in particular, the proof rules in G for induction and coinduction
require explicitly providing invariants and co-invariants. However, Abella leaves such
invariants implicit, opting for a more natural and convenient kind of guarded circular
reasoning to account for induction and coinduction.
10.1 A simple proof using Abella
Before illustrating how Abella can deal with bindings in specifications and in reasoning,
we first illustrate how to use this system to prove a few elementary theorems. Figure 7
displays the Abella specification of the natural number type, the constructors for that
type, the predicate that describes the set of natural numbers, and the ternary relation
that defines addition of natural numbers. Figure 8 displays the statement of three
theorems that prove the commutativity of addition. Readers familiar with the Coq
theorem prover will no doubt see a similarity to this style of declaration and proof
script.
To illustrate the style of inductive reasoning that is used in Abella, we present some




Type s nat -> nat.
Define nat : nat -> prop by
nat z ;
nat (s N) := nat N.
Define plus : nat -> nat -> nat -> prop by
plus z N N ;
plus (s M) N (s K) := plus M N K.
Fig. 7 An Abella specification of natural numbers and addition
Theorem plus_zero : forall N, nat N -> plus N z N.
induction on 1. intros. case H1.
search.
apply IH to H2. search.
Theorem plus_succ :
forall M N K, plus M N K -> plus M (s N) (s K).
induction on 1. intros. case H1.
search.
apply IH to H2. search.
Theorem plus_comm :
forall M N K, nat K -> plus M N K -> plus N M K.
induction on 2. intros. case H2.
apply plus_zero to H1. search.
case H1. apply IH to H4 H3. apply plus_succ to H5. search.
Fig. 8 An Abella theorem file proving the commutativity of addition
of the theorem and the issuance of the induction on 2 and intros proof tactics, the
Abella proof state is denoted by a sequent written as follows.
Variables: M N K
IH : forall M N K, nat K -> plus M N K * -> plus N M K
H1 : nat K
H2 : plus M N K @
============================
plus N M K
The list of variables in the first line are the eigenvariables that are bound over this
sequent. The assumption IH is the inductive assumption and H1 and H2 are two ad-
ditional assumptions that can be used to prove the last formula displayed. Note the
addition of the annotation * in the inductive hypothesis and @ in the H2 assumption:
these are used to stop (guard against) the fallacious circular reasoning that could result
by applying the inductive hypothesis too quickly in the proof. In particular, inductive
restrictions are represented by tagging an atomic formula with * (smaller) and with @
(equal). These annotations are used to implicitly track the size of inductive arguments
rather than using explicit numeric values. Experience with Abella suggests that using
these annotations is much more natural than requiring the insertion of an actual invari-
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ant (as required by the proof system for G): the soundness of using such annotations
is argued in [52].
To continue with this proof, one must perform a case analysis on H2 before applying
the inductive hypothesis. In particular, the case H2 proof step results in two subcases
(in both cases, the @ annotation is replaced with a * annotation). The first one is
represented by the proof state
Variables: K
IH : forall M N K, nat K -> plus M N K * -> plus N M K
H1 : nat K
============================
plus K z K
This case can be proved by invoking the previously proved lemma plus_zero. The
second case is represented by the proof state
Variables: N K1 M1
IH : forall M N K, nat K -> plus M N K * -> plus N M K
H1 : nat (s K1)
H3 : plus M1 N K1 *
============================
plus N (s M1) (s K1)
The case H1 command performs inversion on the H1 assumption: that is, the only way
that (s K1) can be a natural number is for K1 to be a natural number: the state of the
proving session is now
Variables: N K1 M1
IH : forall M N K, nat K -> plus M N K * -> plus N M K
H3 : plus M1 N K1 *
H4 : nat K1
============================
plus N (s M1) (s K1)
The apply IH to H4 H3 proof step employs the inductive assumption (since the *
annotations in IH and H3 match) and the plus_succ theorem completes the proof.
10.2 The π-calculus
The π-calculus [107,108] is an interesting challenge for formalization since its metathe-
ory must deal with not only bindings, substitution, and α-conversion but also with
induction and coinduction. This calculus also has a mature theory [109,144] which is a
great aid in developing and judging formalizations. We shall assume that the reader is
already familiar with the traditional formalization and meta-theory of the π-calculus
as given in these references. In this section, we present an alternative formalization of
the π-calculus that makes use of the ∇-quantifier and the logic G.
10.2.1 Encoding the syntax of the π-calculus
In order to encode the π-calculus processes, we introduce two primitive types p and n
denoting the syntactic categories for processes and names, respectively. The syntax of
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Kind n, p type.
Type null p.
Type taup p -> p.
Type plus , par p -> p -> p.
Type match , out n -> n -> p -> p.
Type in n -> (n -> p) -> p.
Type nu (n -> p) -> p.
Fig. 9 Abella specifications for the syntax of the finite π-calculus.
processes for the π-calculus is generally given as follows:
P := 0 | τ.P | x(y).P | x̄y.P | (P | P ) | (P + P ) | (y)P | [x = y]P.
Expressions in the π-calculus can be formalized as simply typed λ-terms using the
signature of constants given in Figure 9. That signature contains one constructor of
type p for each different kind of expression allowed. In particular, there are two binding
constructors: the restriction operator (y)P is encoded using the constant nu of type
(n -> p) -> p and the input prefix x(y).P is encoded using the constant in of type
n -> (n -> p) -> p. The expressions (nu (y\ P y)) and (in x (y\ P y)) encodes
π-calculus expressions of the form (y)Py and x(y).Py, respectively, where the expression
Py is a term of type p which may contain a free occurrence of the variable y of type n.
Since the equality of simply typed λ-terms used here includes the η-rule, the expressions
(nu (y\ P y)) and (in x (y\ P y)) can also be written as (nu P) and (in x P).
Formally, this version of the π-calculus is usually referred to as the finite π-calculus
since it lacks a replication operator or any method for recursive definitions. Versions of
the π-calculus with replications or recursive definitions can be treated similarly [159].
10.2.2 Encoding the labeled transition system
In order to encode π-calculus transitions we introduce a new primitive type for the
syntactic category of action expressions. There are three constructors for actions: τ : a
for silent actions, ↓ : n → n → a for input actions, and ↑ : n → n → a for output
actions. The action of inputting y on channel x is written as ↓xy : a and the action
of outputting y on channel x is written as ↑xy : a. The bound actions are expressions
of the form ↓x : n → a (bound input on channel x) and ↑x : n → a (bound output
on channel x). Constructors for encoding τ , ↑, and ↓ are given in the first lines of
Figure 10.
One-step transitions for π-calculus expressions are encoded using two ternary-
predicates: the arrow ·
·
−−→ · of type p → a → p → prop and the arrow ·
·
−−⇀ ·
of type p → (n → a) → (n → p) → prop. Here, P
A
−−→ Q encodes a transition where
A is a free or silent action and P
A
−−⇀ Q encodes a transition where A is a bound
action. In particular, P
↓ x
−−⇀ M encodes the fact that P makes a bound input action
↓x : n→ a to the abstracted process M : n→ p and P
↑ x
−−⇀ M encodes the fact that
P makes a bound output action, ↑x : n→ a to the abstracted process M : n→ p.
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These inference rules—named output-act, res, and open, respectively—are easily
encoded using the following clauses.
one (out X Y P) (up X Y) P ;
one (nu P) A (nu P’) := nabla x, one (P x) A (P’ x);
oneb (nu M) (up X) P’ :=
nabla y, one (M y) (up X y) (P’ y);
oneb (nu P) A (y\ nu (x\ P’ x y)) :=
nabla x, oneb (P x) A (P’ x);
The rule called res is encoded with two clauses since the original rule can be applied
to both free and bound action transitions. Note that there is no need to encode the side
conditions present in the inference rule version of these rules since the usual notion of
quantifier scoping (including the ∇-quantifier) correctly captures those side conditions.
Note also that the type of the bound variable P’ in these clauses varies: in the second
and fourth clauses, its type is n→ p while in the third clause, its type is n→ n→ p.
The full encoding of the one step (late) transitions for the finite π-calculus (that is,
the rules from [108] except for the IDE rule) is given in Figure 10. The correctness of
this encoding is discussed in [104,156].
It is proved in [104, Theorem 7.10] that when implications (and, hence, negations)
are not present in the body of a specification, then occurrence of ∇ in that specification
can be replaced with ∀ (and vice-versus) and the same atomic formulas are provable.
Thus, if we are only interested in proving atomic formulas, then all of the ∇-quantifiers
in Figure 10 can be changed to ∀ and there would be no difference between those two
definitions as to the one and onep atomic formula that are provable. Specifications
of the π-calculus containing universal quantifiers instead have been written in, say,
λProlog [99,102].
Consider using this transition definition in the context of a negation. The process
(y)[x = y]x̄w.0, where w is some constant, cannot make a (free or bound) transition
since y has to be “new” and cannot be equal to x. Thus the following formula is
provable using the specification in Figure 10.
∀x∀Q∀α.[((y)[x = y](x̄w.0)
α
−−→ Q) ⊃ ⊥]
This theorem and its brief proof can be entered into Abella as follows (here, w is a
constant of type name):
Theorem example1 : forall x Q A,
one (nu y\ match x y (out x w null)) A Q -> false.
intros. case H1. case H2.
The last step in this proof formally involves a unification that is rather similar to the
unification problem mentioned in Section 9: that is, this last step in the proof succeeds
because the unification problem (λy.x) = (λy.y) fails (since there is no substitution for




Type up, dn n -> n -> act.
Define
one : p -> act -> p -> prop ,
oneb : p -> (n -> act) -> (n -> p) -> prop
by
oneb (in X M) (dn X) M ;
one (out X Y P) (up X Y) P ;
one (taup P) tau P ;
one (match X X P) A Q := one P A Q ;
oneb (match X X P) A M := oneb P A M ;
one (plus P Q) A R := one P A R ;
one (plus P Q) A R := one Q A R ;
oneb (plus P Q) A M := oneb P A M ;
oneb (plus P Q) A M := oneb Q A M ;
one (par P Q) A (par P’ Q) := one P A P’ ;
one (par P Q) A (par P Q’) := one Q A Q’ ;
oneb (par P Q) A (x\ par (M x) Q) := oneb P A M ;
oneb (par P Q) A (x\ par P (N x)) := oneb Q A N ;
one (nu P) A (nu Q) := nabla x, one (P x) A (Q x);
oneb (nu P) A (y\ nu (x\ Q x y)) := nabla x, oneb (P x) A (Q x);
oneb (nu M) (up X) N := nabla y, one (M y) (up X y) (N y) ;
one (par P Q) tau (nu y\ par (M y) (N y)) :=
exists X, oneb P (dn X) M /\ oneb Q (up X) N ;
one (par P Q) tau (nu y\ par (M y) (N y)) :=
exists X, oneb P (up X) M /\ oneb Q (dn X) N ;
one (par P Q) tau (par (M Y) T) :=
exists X, oneb P (dn X) M /\ one Q (up X Y) T ;
one (par P Q) tau (par R (M Y)) :=
exists X, oneb Q (dn X) M /\ one P (up X Y) R.
Fig. 10 Specifications of the one step (late) transitions for the finite π-calculus.
10.2.3 Some of the metatheory of the π-calculus
The quality of this specification of the π-calculus transition semantics is high, as illus-
trated by the following observations.
When instantiating the quantifiers (implicitly) quantifying the many clauses in
Figure 10, the resulting formulas may contain subterms that are not β-normal. Only
the last two clause rules yield instances in which the resulting β-redexes are actually
not β0-redexes (Section 5). If we delete those last two clauses from Figure 10, we get the
πI -calculus (the π-calculus with internal mobility [143]). Since the only β-conversion
needed is β0-conversion, we can view the πI -calculus as a subset of the π-calculus in
which β-conversion is only used to provide binder mobility (in the sense described in
Section 5) and not more.
The definition of simulation for the π-calculus can be given as the greatest fixed
point of the following recursive definition.
sim P Q
4
= ∀A,P ′ [P
A
−−→ P ′ ⇒ ∃Q′.Q
A
−−→ Q′ ∧ sim P ′ Q′] ∧
∀X,P ′ [P
↓X
−−⇀ P ′ ⇒ ∃Q′.Q
↓X
−−⇀ Q′ ∧ ∀w.sim (P ′w) (Q′w)] ∧
∀X,P ′ [P
↑X
−−⇀ P ′ ⇒ ∃Q′.Q
↑X
−−⇀ Q′ ∧∇w.sim (P ′w) (Q′w)]
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CoDefine bisim : p -> p -> prop by
bisim P Q :=
(forall A P’, one P A P’ ->
exists Q’, one Q A Q’ /\ bisim P’ Q’) /\
(forall X M, oneb P (dn X) M ->
exists N, oneb Q (dn X) N /\ forall W, bisim (M W) (N W)) /\
(forall X M, oneb P (up X) M ->
exists N, oneb Q (up X) N /\ nabla w, bisim (M w) (N w)) /\
(forall A Q’, one Q A Q’ ->
exists P’, one P A P’ /\ bisim P’ Q’) /\
(forall X N, oneb Q (dn X) N ->
exists M, oneb P (dn X) M /\ forall W, bisim (M W) (N W)) /\
(forall X N, oneb Q (up X) N ->
exists M, oneb P (up X) M /\ nabla w, bisim (M w) (N w)).
Fig. 11 Bisimulation for the π-calculus
Bound actions use two different quantifiers to handle the continuation of a process: an
input bound action uses ∀ while the output bound action uses ∇. The corresponding
coinductive definition of bisimulation is displayed using Abella syntax in Figure 11.
As proved in [104], this coinductive definition corresponds to open bisimulation on
the finite π-calculus. If we changed from the intuitionistic logic of Abella to classical
logic instead, then late bisimulation is captured. In particular, late bisimulation can
be captured by assuming ∀x∀y. x = y ∨ x 6= y, a particular instance of the excluded
middle [159].
The specification for the π-calculus above (and some variants of it) has also been
used in formal proofs of various aspects of the metatheory of the π-calculus. For ex-
ample, the Abella website [1] contains a formal proof that open bisimulation is a con-
gruence and that bisimulation-up-to bisimilarity [106,139] is sound (see also [27]). The
modal logics for π-calculus given in [109] have also been formalized in the logic un-
derlying Abella [4,161,159]. The model checker Bedwyr [16] provides an automated
implementation of part of Abella: that implementation provides a basic model checker
for the π-calculus [157] and some extensions of it [162].
The Coq theorem prover has been used to formalize the metatheory of the π-
calculus. Generally, two kinds of packages have been added to Coq for this purpose.
First, a package that provides flexible methods for doing coinduction following, say,
the Knaster-Tarski fixed point theorems, is necessary. Indeed, such a package has been
implemented and used to prove various metatheorems surrounding bisimulation-up-to
(including the subtle metatheory surrounding weak bisimulation) [22,137,138]. Sec-
ond, a package for the treatment of bindings and names that are used to describe the
operational semantics of the π-calculus. Such packages exist (for example, see [10])
and, when combined with treatments of coinduction, may allow one to make progress
on the metatheory of the π-calculus. Recently, the Hybrid systems [44] has shown a
different way to incorporate both induction, coinduction, and binding into a Coq (and
Isabelle) implementation. Such an approach could be seen as one way to implement
this metatheory task on top of an establish formalization of mathematics. A still dif-
ferent approach to using Coq was taken by Honsell, Miculan, and Scagnetto in [72] in
their “Theory of Context.” While their logical foundations is rather different from that
described here, their specifications of, say, bisimulation strongly resemble the specifi-
cations given above. In particular, the ∇-quantifier can be used to define in Abella a
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Kind atm , atmlist type.
Type nl atmlist.
Type cons atm -> atmlist -> atmlist.
Type tt o.
Type atom atm -> o.
Type or, and o -> o -> o.
Type imp atm -> o -> o.
Type all (tm -> o) -> o.
Type ex (tm -> o) -> o.
Define seq : nat -> atmlist -> o -> prop by
seq (s N) L tt ;
seq (s N) L (atom A) := mem A L ;
seq (s N) L (or A B) := seq N L A ;
seq (s N) L (or A B) := seq N L B ;
seq (s N) L (and A B) := seq N L A /\ seq N L B ;
seq (s N) L (imp A B) := seq N (cons A L) B ;
seq (s N) L (all G) := nabla x, seq N L (G x) ;
seq (s N) L (ex G) := exists X, seq N L (G X) ;
seq (s N) L (atom A) := exists B, prog A B /\ seq N L B.
Fig. 12 Definition of provability in the specification level logic.
freshness predicate fresh x t which holds if x is a nominal that does not appear free in
t. If we let B be a formula whose free variables are among z, x1, . . . , xn, and let x be
the term x1 :: . . . :: xn :: nil (where :: and nil are constructors for lists), then the three
formulas
∇z.B ∃z.(fresh z x ∧B) ∀z.(fresh z x ⊃ B)
are provably equivalent in Abella [55]. Replacing the freshness predicate with the notin
predicate of [72] illustrates the strong similarity between their encoding of bisimulation
and the one in Figure 11.
11 The two-level logic approach as implemented in Abella
At the end of Section 8, the need for both the open-world assumption (for a declar-
ative treatment of λ-tree syntax) and the closed-world assumption (for the treatment
of induction) was motivated. Following the two-level logic approach of [56,90], we now
present an Abella (reasoning-level logic) specification of provability for an object-level
logic (essentially a restricted form of λProlog). This design will formally allow estab-
lishing “substitution lemmas for free” by using cut-elimination.
Consider the specification of an (object) logic (terms of type o) as well as of cut-free
provability via the seq predicate. In this example, object-level formulas are limited
so that the left of an implication is restricted to be only an atomic formula. This
restriction is sometimes used to make the formal presentation of object-level provability
simpler [88,90]: the recent versions of Abella, however, removes that restriction [15,
171]. This specification is also partial since it does not define the (obvious) membership
relation mem on atmlist nor the prog relationship. This latter relation is used to hold
the logic programming specification on which we plan to prove theorems. For example,
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Theorem seq_monotone : forall L1 L2 G N,
seq N L1 G -> (forall X, mem X L1 -> mem X L2) -> seq N L2 G.
Theorem seq_cut : forall K L G N M,
nat N -> seq N (cons K L) G -> nat M -> seq M L (atom K) ->
exists P, nat P /\ seq P L G.
Fig. 13 Some metatheorems which have been proved about the specification level logic.
Theorem mem_inst : forall L A,
nabla (x:tm), mem (A x) (L x) -> forall T, mem (A T) (L T).
Theorem seq_inst : forall N L G,
nabla (x:tm), seq N (L x) (G x) -> forall T, seq N (L T) (G T).
Fig. 14 Two theorems of the form ∇x.P (x) ⊃ ∀x.P (x).
the evaluation and typing rules for the untyped λ-calculus given in Figures 4 and 6 can
be written as the following definition of prog within Abella. (Essentially, prog is the
prefix version of what is written as the infix symbol :- in λProlog.)
Define prog : atm -> o -> prop by
prog (eval (abs R) (abs R)) tt ;
prog (eval (app P Q) V) (and (atom (eval P (abs R)))
(atom (eval (R Q) V))) ;
prog (of (abs R) (arrow A B))
(all x\ imp (of x A) (atom (of (R x) B))) ;
prog (of (app P Q) B) (and (atom (of P (arrow A B)))
(atom (of Q A))).
For the sake of providing variety, this definition of eval encodes call-by-name evaluation
whereas the specification in Figure 4 encodes call-by-value evaluation.
The two theorems in Figure 13 state properties of object-level provability. Theorem
seq_monotone states that when every member of the list of hypotheses L1 is a member
of the list of hypotheses L2 then the existence of a proof of height bounded by N using
L1 guarantees the existence of a proof of height bounded by N using L2. This theorem
can be used to show that contraction and weakening are admissible rules of inference.
Theorem seq_cut states that atomic instances of the cuts rule are admissible.
As noted in Section 9, it is not generally the case that ∇x.P (x) ⊃ ∀x.P (x) is
provable. There are a number of situations, however, where this entailment does hold.
For example, Theorem mem_inst in Figure 13 states that this entailment holds when
the property P (x) refers to membership in a list and Theorem seq_inst states that
this also holds for object-level provability. Both of these theorems can be proved by
straightforward induction.
Given the theorems above regarding properties of the object-logic, we can now
formally prove the type-preservation theorem that was informally proved in Section 6.4.
Given the encoding described above, this can be written as
Theorem type_preserve : forall E V A M N N’,
nat N’ -> lt N N’ -> seq N nl (atom (eval E V)) ->
nat M -> seq M nl (atom (of E A)) ->
exists P, nat P /\ seq P nl (atom (of V A)).
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Although this encoding is a bit awkward to read, the formal proof in Abella of this
theorem follows the proof outline given in Section 6.4: where an eigenvariable is in-
stantiated, the theorem seq_inst is invoked and where modus ponens was used, the
theorem seq_cut is invoked.
Abella provides object-level provability as a built-in feature. In particular, the
Abella expression {L |- G} abbreviates exists N, nat N /\ seq N L G: if the list L is
empty, then that expression is written simply as {G}. The three theorems seq_monotone,
seq_cut, and seq_inst are made available as specific tactics within Abella. Further-
more, Abella can build the prog predicate from (restricted) λProlog logic program and
signature files.
To illustrate these features within Abella, assume that the clauses in Figures 4
and 6 are gathered together into one logic program that is loaded into Abella (via
the prog binary predicate). The type_preserve theorem above can be rewritten and
formally proved correct using the following.
Theorem type_preserve :
forall E V T, {eval E V} -> {of E T} -> {of V T}.
induction on 1. intros. case H1.
search.
case H2.
apply IH to H3 H6. case H8. apply IH to H4 H7.
inst H9 with n1 = U. cut H11 with H10.
apply IH to H5 H12. search.
Just before the inst command is issued, the proof system of Abella appears as follows.
Variables: V T U R N M B
IH : forall E V T, {eval E V}* -> {of E T} -> {of V T}
H3 : {eval M (abs R)}*
H4 : {eval N U}*
H5 : {eval (R U) V}*
H6 : {of M (arr B T)}
H7 : {of N B}
H9 : {of n1 B |- of (R n1) T}
H10 : {of U B}
============================
{of V T}
The list of variables (in the first line) are the eigenvariables that are bound in this
sequent. The inductive hypothesis is labeled with IH and the asterisks on some of
the assumptions are part of Abella’s approach to doing induction (as mentioned in
Section 10.1: see [15,52] for more on this approach to induction). Assumption H9 cap-
tures the object-level provability judgment that for a fresh object-level eigenvariable
n1 (captured as a nominal), that the object-level sequent {of n1 B |- of (R n1) T}
is provable. The inst H9 with n1 = U is responsible for instantiating the nominal n1
with the term U yielding the hypothesis
H11 : {of U B |- of (R U) T}
That is, since H9 holds generically (that is, for a nominal n1) then it holds for every
instant of that nominal. Similarly, the cut command applies that hypothetical to the
assumption H10 and this yields the additional assumption
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H12 : {of (R U) T}
Applying the inductive hypothesis IH to hypotheses H5 and H12 finally yields the de-
sired goal. The combination of the inst and cut commands provides an elegant and
completely formal proof of the key substitution lemma in the proof, namely that if the
type of (abs R) is the arrow type (arr B T) and if U has type B then the result of
instantiating the abstract (abs R) with U, that is, (R U), has type T. The proof of this
substitution lemma follows the simple line of reasoning described in Section 6.4.
The Abella system has been successfully used to prove a range of metatheoretic
properties about well known formal systems. Several such examples are listed below:
the formal treatment of several of these topics can be found on the Abella prover’s
website [1].
– Untyped λ-calculus: Takahashi’s proof of the Church-Rosser property using com-
plete developments, a characterization of β-reduction via paths through terms;
Loader’s proof of standardization; type preservation of call-by-name and call-by-
value for simple types and system F types; and Huet’s proof of the cube property
of λ-calculus residuals [3].
– Simply typed λ-calculus: Tait’s logical relations argument for weak normalization
and Girard’s proof of strong normalization.
– Object-level proof systems: cut-elimination and the completeness of a Frege-style
proof system.
– Formalized metatheory for the process calculi CCS and π-calculus: see Section 10.2
and [4,159].
– Specifications and correctness proofs for various techniques used by compilers for
functional programming languages [170,172].
12 Related work
Two broad avenues of attacking the general area of mechanizing metatheory have
been developed. One such approach has involved designing and implementing computer
systems that provide tools for analyzing and automating entire programming languages
and specification languages. While there are too many such systems to survey them
here, we mention a few from different periods during the last 3 decades. Two systems
from Inria in the 1980’s were the Mentor [38] and Centaur systems [24]. The Ergo
Support System [81] was also from that same period: that system proposed to use the
Elf automation of LF signatures for capturing programming language specifications.
The following systems have been built to support reasoning about various concurrency
calculi: the Concurrency Workbench [32], the Mobility Workbench [169], and the more
recent Psi-calculus Workbench [23]. A number of recent textbooks have been written
that use the Agda and Coq proof assistants to formally reason about programs and
programming languages [30,130,154]. The OTT system [150] provides a convenient
means for defining the static and dynamic semantics of programming languages and
for exporting those definitions to various proof assistants.
A second approach to mechanizing metatheory has been to look into the founda-
tions of logic—particularly following the perspectives found in proof theory and type
theory—and uncover logical principles that can be directly employed to support mech-
anized metatheory. As we have illustrated here, pursuing this course has occasionally
lead researchers to develop new logical principles (for example, λ-tree syntax) and
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connectives (for example, the ∇-quantifier). This line of research can be traced back
to Church’s Simple Theory of Types [31] since it contains the main ingredients for
supporting λ-tree syntax. Because Church was interested in supporting mathematical
reasoning, his addition of mathematical axioms (extensionally and choice, in partic-
ular) made the theory of λ-expressions in the resulting system too strong to support
λ-tree syntax: the weaker Elementary Type Theory (ETT) does provide, however, a
good starting point. Probably the first computational system that captured some as-
pects of λ-tree syntax was the template-based rewriting system of Huet & Lang [76] in
which second-order matching was used to match and rewrite program expressions con-
taining bindings. λProlog was the first programming language to support the full range
of features needed to manipulate λ-tree syntax [97,98,101] and the Elf system [125]
provided similar support by automating proof search based on LF dependently-typed
λ-calculus.
Shortly after these first programming language systems appeared, tools for per-
forming inductive proofs over λ-tree syntax were implemented. The first such system
was Twelf [128], an extension to the Elf system that could determine, for example,
that given dependently-typed relations were total and/or functional. A proof theory
for induction (over natural numbers) and an early implementations of the two-level
logic approach to reasoning based on the Pi proof editor [41] are given in [87–89]. With
the addition of the ∇-quantifier [103,104] and stronger forms of induction and coin-
duction [14,54,160], the G logic was design to incorporate these various features: it is
that logic which is built into the Abella theorem prover. Besides the Abella and Twelf
system, a number of other implemented systems support some or all aspects of λ-tree
syntax: these include Beluga [129], Hybrid [44], Isabelle [123], Minlog [147], and the
Teyjus [115] and ELPI [40] implementations of λProlog. Some of these systems have
been explicitly compared and contrasted in recent papers [45,46,78,112]. Addition-
ally, benchmark problems that are unique to metaprogramming problems have been
proposed to test the ability of mechanized metatheory provers [12,47].
There is a spectrum of how abstract or concrete the encoding of bindings in syntax
can be in different computer systems. The λ-tree syntax approach is at the abstract
extreme since it hides away completely the names of bindings and it allows term-level
binding to move into bindings of the surrounding proof state. Techniques that encode
bindings with string names are, in many ways, too concrete. The use of de Bruijn’s
nameless dummies [36] provides some abstraction but often many concrete details
remain to clutter up meaningful semantic specifications. Intermediate approaches are
also possible: for example, the nominal logic approach of Pitts and Gabbay [131,49],
which abstracts away variable names without using the notion of binder mobility, has
successfully been attached to a number of programming languages, logics, and theorem
provers [10,28,132,136,164–166].
13 Conclusions
We have argued that parsing concrete syntax into parse trees does not yield a suffi-
ciently abstract representation of expressions and we have motivated the λ-tree syntax
approach for treating binders more abstractly. For a programming language or proof
assistant to support this level of abstraction in syntax, equality of syntax must be
based on α and at least the β0 subset of β conversion and must allow for the mobility
of binders from within terms to within formulas (i.e., quantifiers) and proof state (i.e.,
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eigenvariables). We have also argued that the logic programming paradigm—broadly
interpreted—provides an elegant and high-level framework for specifying both compu-
tation and deduction involving syntax containing bindings. This framework is offered
up as an alternative to the more conventional approaches to mechanizing metatheory
using formalizations based on more conventional mathematical concepts. While the
POPLmark challenge was based on the assumption that increments to existing provers
will solve the problems surrounding the mechanization of metatheory, we have argued
against that assumption.
We have described an extension of ETT targeting metatheory and not mathematics.
The resulting logic provides for λ-tree syntax in a direct fashion, via binder-mobility,∇-
quantification, and the unification of λ-terms. Induction over syntax containing bind-
ings is available: in its richest setting, such induction is done over sequent calculus
proofs of typing derivations. The Abella interactive theorem prover, which includes
these logical principles, has been used to capture important aspects of the metatheory
of the λ-calculus, π-calculus, programming languages, and object-logics.
The shift from conventional proof assistants based on functional programming prin-
ciples to assistants based on logic programming principles does disrupt a number of
aspects of proof assistants. For example, when computations are naturally considered
as functional, it seems that there is a loss of expressiveness and effectiveness if one must
write those specifications using relations. Recent work shows, however, that when a re-
lation actually encodes a function, it is possible to use the proof search framework
to actually compute that function [59]. A popular feature of many proof assistants is
the use of tactics and tacticals, which have been implemented using functional pro-
grams since their introduction [65]. There are good arguments, however, that those
operators can be given elegant and natural implementations using (higher-order) logic
programs [39,42,99]. We have tried to argue in this paper that the disruptions that
result from such a shift are well worth exploring.
Finally, we have argued that basic aspects of provers—terms and equality on
them—need to be rethought and re-implemented in order to build a new approach
to proving. During the past 30 years, a number of researchers have been working on
developing the theoretical background and related implementations to help validate
this new approach to theorem proving of metatheory. Two such computer systems,
λProlog and Abella, are highlighted.
Acknowledgments. I thank Gopalan Nadathur and the anonymous reviewers for
their many helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. This work was funded
in part by the ERC Advanced Grant ProofCert.
References
1. The Abella prover, 2012. Available at http://abella-prover.org/.
2. S. Abramsky. The lazy lambda calculus. In D. A. Turner, editor, Research Topics in
Functional Programming, pages 65–116. Addison-Welsey, Reading, MA, 1990.
3. Beniamino Accattoli. Proof pearl: Abella formalization of lambda calculus cube prop-
erty. In Chris Hawblitzel and Dale Miller, editors, Second International Conference on
Certified Programs and Proofs, volume 7679 of LNCS, pages 173–187. Springer, 2012.
4. Ki Yung Ahn, Ross Horne, and Alwen Tiu. A Characterisation of Open Bisimilarity
using an Intuitionistic Modal Logic. In Roland Meyer and Uwe Nestmann, editors, 28th
International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2017), volume 85 of Leibniz
International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), pages 7:1–7:17, Dagstuhl, Germany,
2017. Schloss Dagstuhl–Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik.
36
5. Thorsten Altenkirch. A formalization of the strong normalization proof for system F in
LEGO. In Typed Lambda Calculi and Applications (TLCA), volume 664, pages 13–28,
1993.
6. Peter B. Andrews. Resolution in type theory. J. of Symbolic Logic, 36:414–432, 1971.
7. Peter B. Andrews. Provability in elementary type theory. Zeitschrift fur Mathematische
Logic und Grundlagen der Mathematik, 20:411–418, 1974.
8. Peter B. Andrews. An Introduction to Mathematical Logic and Type Theory: To Truth
Through Proof. Kluwer Academic Publishers, second edition, 2002.
9. Andrew W. Appel and Amy P. Felty. Polymorphic lemmas and definitions in λProlog
and Twelf. Theory and Practice of Logic Programming, 4(1-2):1–39, 2004.
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editor, 2nd Scandinavian Logic Symposium, pages 63–92. North-Holland, Amsterdam,
1971.
62. Jean-Yves Girard. A fixpoint theorem in linear logic. An email posting to the mailing
list linear@cs.stanford.edu, February 1992.
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